On the basis of the characterization of autonomy set out by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics, we first explore some of the parameters along which autonomy may vary in degree through a series of hypothetical examples drawn from various settings; and, second and in more detail, we examine how the range of autonomy is affected through informed consent to various medical diagnostic tests. Our conclusions are (1) that there are significant implications for patient autonomy inherent in new (...) and forthcoming diagnostic modalities, and (2) that attention should be paid to these implications in formulating policies for both clinical practice and research. We close with (a) some specific policy recommendations for clinical practice and research, and (b) some metaphysical speculations raised by our explorations. (shrink)

For much of European Christian history, asceticism has been associated with the capacity to transform individuals as well as societies. As an organised collaborative exercise in monasteries, asceticism enabled monks not only to live a life preparing for eternal life but also to generate ground-breaking technical and social innovations. Drawing on identity theories and recent developments in the social movement literature, we examine how asceticism has been the impetus for various individual and societal transformations and explore whether asceticism can still (...) unfold such transformative power. In particular, we discuss whether and how ongoing movements for Voluntary Simplicity (VS) and further reflections on that, as found, for example, in the work of the sociologist Ulrich Beck, might assist humans in coping with climate change. Our article contributes to recent environmental ethics research by exploring the role of asceticism in potentially triggering collective climate action and its contribution to helping individuals to live meaningful lives in the face of climate change. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics ALFRED R. MELE COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) (...) and that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference? This "two notion" interpretation is motivated by the following three considerations: i. Aristotle's good or virtuous agent is said (NE 2. 11o5a28-33, cf. NE 6. 1144ax8-2o ) to choose actions for their own sakes; but, according to the This paper is derived in part from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, which was submitted to the University of Michigan in January of 1979. 1 would like to express my gratitttde to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Nicholas P. White, for his comments and criticisms on the relevant sections during the preparation of my dissertation and to theJHP's anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms and queries. ' It has often been pointed out that things which are pros an end are not necessarily "means," in the ordinary sense of the word. E.g., constituents of an end are pros the end, but they are not means to it. See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, trans. Leonard H. G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19o9), pp. 46-47, 53ff.: and John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 1o-22. ' Among the many proponents of this "two notion" interpretation are William D. Ross and Donald J. Allan. See Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, t953), p. 2oo. See Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 197o), p. 132; idem, "Aristotle 's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles," Xlth International Congress of Philosophy 12 (1953):124; idem, "The Practical Syllogism," in Autour d'Aristote, Studies for A. Mansion (Louvain : Publications Universitaires, 1955). Richard Sorabji, in "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 l t973-74]:t t6), says that he has noticed sixteen commentators who take this view. [4o5] 406 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY so-called formal account of prohairesis (NE 3. 2-3, 6. 2), the object of choice is what has been decided upon by deliberation (bouleuais), and what is decided upon by deliberation is a "means" to an end. 2. Aristotle says that choice is "closely bound up with virtue" and "discriminates characters better than actions do" (1 1t lb5; cf. t i lob3t, 1117a 5, 1163a22, 1t64bi); but commentators argue that these claims about choice are false unless choice is "of ends." 3. Though Aristotle holds that the impetuous akrat~s (incontinent agent) does not deliberate (e.g., t 152a 18-19), he says that the akrat~s' choice is good (1152ax5--17; cf. l l51a5-- 7, 29--32); and this appears to contradict his position in Book 3 that the object of choice is what is decided upon by deliberation, s In this paper I shall show that only one (philosophically significant) notion ofprohairesis is employed in the NE, namely, the notion developed in the "formal account" of deliberation and choice (3- 2-3, 6. 2), according to which choice is specifically of things which are pros ends. This point has several interesting applications. For example, it makes it easier to find in Aristotle (as I shall briefly explain) a comprehensive theory of practical reasoning or inference rather than several unconnected accounts of what practical inference is like in different types of cases; and it is helpful in clarifying what is involved in the evaluation of character on Aristotle's view (see Sec. ~). However, though I do think that the main point to be made... (shrink)

This book discusses in dialogue form the basic principles of mathematics and its applications including the question: What is mathematics? What does its specific method consist of? What is its relation to the sciences and humanities? What can it offer to specialists in different fields? How can it be applied in practice and in discovering the laws of nature? Dramatized by the dialogue form and shown in the historical movements in which they originated, these questions are discussed in their full (...) complexity, yet are easily comprehended. The first dialogue, whose chief actor is Socrates, leads the reader to the source of modern mathematics in Athens in the 5th Century BC. The second dialogue, featuring Archimedes, takes place during the siege of Syracuse in 212 BC and shows the birth of applied mathematics. The third dialogue occurs in the year 1633 in Rome, its chief character being Galileo Galilei who fully realized the central importance of the mathematical method in discovering the laws of nature. Intended as supplemental reading for philosophy of mathematics courses at the high school or college level it will be of interest to both specialists and non-specialists in mathematics. Alfréd Rényi was born in Budapest Hungary in 1921. He studied mathematics and physics at the University of Budapest and received his Ph. D. from the University of Szaged in 1945. Since 1950 he has been Director of the Mathematical Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and since 1952 a professor at the University of Budapest. Dr. Renyi was a visiting professor at Michigan State University in 1961, at the University of Michigan in 1964 and at Stanford University in 1966. His main fields of research are probability theory, mathematical statistics and information theory, and he has also worked in analytic number theory as well as in various branches of analysis, combinatorial analysis and geometry. (shrink)

etudes de psychologie experimentale / par Alfred Binet,...Date de l'edition originale: 1888Sujet de l'ouvrage: Psychologie experimentaleCollection: Bibliotheque des actualites medicales et scientifiques; 7Ce livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la BnF.Les oeuvres faisant partie de (...) cette collection ont ete numerisees par la BnF et sont presentes sur Gallica, sa bibliotheque numerique.En entreprenant de redonner vie a ces ouvrages au travers d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande, nous leur donnons la possibilite de rencontrer un public elargi et participons a la transmission de connaissances et de savoirs parfois difficilement accessibles.Nous avons cherche a concilier la reproduction fidele d'un livre ancien a partir de sa version numerisee avec le souci d'un confort de lecture optimal. Nous esperons que les ouvrages de cette nouvelle collection vous apporteront entiere satisfaction.Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.frhttp: //gallica.bnf.fr/ark: /12148/bpt6k756813. (shrink)

We obtain some new results on the topology of unary definable sets in expansions of densely ordered Abelian groups of burden 2. In the special case in which the structure has dp‐rank 2, we show that the existence of an infinite definable discrete set precludes the definability of a set which is dense and codense in an interval, or of a set which is topologically like the Cantor middle‐third set (Theorem 2.9). If it has burden 2 and both an infinite (...) discrete set D and a dense‐codense set X are definable, then translates of X must witness the Independence Property (Theorem 2.26). In the last section, an explicit example of an ordered Abelian group of burden 2 is given in which both an infinite discrete set and a dense‐codense set are definable. (shrink)

La conscience africaine se voit trop souvent caractérisée par son immédiateté et son innocence. Un chef d'État français n'a-t-il d'ailleurs pas récemment déclaré aux élites intellectuelles africaines, à l'université de Dakar, que leur continent n'était pas assez entré dans l'Histoire? Au-delà de ces clichés, comment penser l'Afrique noire dans un monde où l'Occident a prétendu pendant plus de cinq siècles dominer tant les échanges commerciaux que les échanges d'idées? Dans une démarche à la fois anthropologique, historique et philosophique, Alfred (...) Adler répond à cette question en s'intéressant à l'oeuvre d'Hegel. Ce penseur a, en effet, été convoqué par de nombreux philosophes africains tant pour utiliser sa dialectique libératrice que pour réfuter son discours professoral sur l'Afrique qui pâtissait de ses préjugés. Revenir vers le texte hégélien afin d'en extraire la substance intellectuelle toujours vivante et stimulante en la confrontant à l'histoire de l'Afrique, en particulier les empires de Ghana et Songhay : tel est l'objet de cet ouvrage. En se confrontant à l'"essence" de l'homme africain selon Hegel et à l'idée qu'en Afrique, il n'y a pas de place pour l'éclosion des idées, Alfred Adler nous invite à théoriser une histoire et une conscience propres à ce continent. À l'Afrique, dès lors, de s'inventer un destin. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions METHODOLOGY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: THE CASE OF PIERRE CHARRON Affanities, influences, borrowings, innovations, traditions, consistency--these are some of the key concepts of the time-honored and probably still dominant approach to the history of ideas. Scholars who seek to understand and interpret the philosophy and literature of the past in these terms tend to pay little attention to the social and institutional factors which constituted (...) the working conditions under which the ideas were conceived, articulated and disseminated; and it is precisely on those grounds that the traditional school has been increasingly challenged, over the past several decades, by historians (myself among others) who are convinced that, apart from their social context, the ideas themselves are virtually incomprehensible. A recent article on Pierre Charron by Maryanne Cline Horowitz may serve to illustrate some of the questions raised by these differences in method. At the close of her article, Horowitz explains the assumptions upon which she has conducted her investigation. Citing Peter Gay's interpretation of Ernst Cassirer, she affirms that "the critic begins the process of understanding a philosopher's work by searching for a dynamic center of thought. He must regard doctrines not as a series of discrete positions but as facets of a single point of view. The critic's equipment must therefore include the gift of empathy: he must sympathetically enter--indeed, relive---the thinker's world of ideas.''1 Following her own insight into the spirit of De la sagesse, and supporting it, of course, with a display of textual evidence, Horowitz argues that Richard Popkin was wrong to lay exclusive stress upon Charron's rejection of Aristotelian epistemology from the perspective of Pyrrhonian scepticism. "I think," she says, "that Charron's De la sagesse is based primarily on Stoic, rather than Sceptic principles." Although I agree in general with the main thrust of Popkin's thesis, I too have been critical of his failure to give sufficient weight to the neo-Stoic dements of Charron's thought. Hence it is not this conclusion to which I take exception.2 Charron has, from the very beginning, been found to have said a great many things and been subjected to a wide variety of interpretations. Horowitz emphasizes "the seeds of virtue and knowledge [as] the dynamic center of De la sagesse"--a view which may appear perfectly plausible to some readers. But it can never compel widespread conviction, for the simple reason that it is impossible for a twentieth-century critic to enter--unaided--into a world of ideas now part of a remote past. A book written nearly four centuries ago is not immediately perspicuous. Before trying on our neo-idealist wings and taking flight into the empyrean of late Renaissance moral treatises, we would do well to explore as many as possible of the following questions: Just who was our author? For whom did he write? Who x p. Gay, Introduction to E. Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington, 1963), p. 22, cited by M. C. Horowitz, "Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom," Journal o! the History of Philosophy, IX, 4 (October, 1971), 457. 2 A. Soman, "Pierre Charron: A Revaluation," BibliothOque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXXII (January, 1970), 57 n. 3. [495] 496 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in fact did read him? and how did his readers react? And what did our author think of their reactions.'?s Horowitz does not, apparently, give high priority to such questions. For rhetorical purposes, she readily agrees with Eugene Rice that "Pierre Charron's De la sagesse is the most important Renaissance treatise on wisdom." (Important to whom? and from what point of view? The criteria are not at all clear.) She assumes that Charron's epistemology was consistent, and that the second edition of 1604 represents a clarification of, or advance over, the first edition of 1601. (There is no historical evidence for making either assumption.) And she does not seem to entertain the possibility that Popkin could still be right about the impact of Charron's Pyrrhonian scepticism on the libertins Jrudits, although Charron may never in fact have been a Pyrrhonian sceptic.4 These are... (shrink)

Resolving the strongly polarised debate about whether or not business has social responsibilities may call for distinguishing more clearly between a business as a non‐moral agent with a purely financial raison d'être and its managers who may have wider and more complex commitments. The author worked as a financial manager in industry and taught at City University Business School for many years, and also served on the professional conduct appeal committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. (...) He is currently co‐writing his third book, a study on business strategy. (shrink)

In an article recently published in this journal Prof. David F. Hult argues that a distich absent from Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS fonds français 794 , is superfluous to a proper understanding of Chrétien de Troyes's Le Chevalier de la Charrette . Quite possibly, Hult argues, it represents a scribal accretion that can make no irrefutable claim to be indispensable to a modern scholarly edition of this text. The distich in question was printed by Wendelin Foerster in his edition of (...) the Charrette . Here is Foerster's text. (shrink)

Cette recherche propose d’étudier succinctement, à la suite de travaux de Foucault, deux textes de Platon dans deux contextes différents : au moment de l’apogée de la démocratie athénienne, celui sur Alcibiade, et au moment de la décadence des cités et démocraties grecques, sa Lettre VII. Dans les deux cas, il s’agit de l’éducation d’adultes, le premier, Alcibiade, prétendant à la gestion de la cité, le second, Denis II, nouvellement en exercice. Il est question ici d’identifier dans les deux cas, (...) les présupposés et les obstacles pour que les idées d’éducation et de formation participent à l’accroissement d’une conscience éthique et à la réalisation du politique. Le but étant de montrer, comment cette approche proposée par le jeune et le dernier Platon, peut encore revitaliser l’idée de la formation de l’adulte dans le contexte qui, comme le nôtre, a extirpé sous l’influence du modèle des sciences modernes, du champ de l’éducation et de la formation toutes questions métaphysiques comme celles qui donnent pourtant sens à nos actions, à notre existence et à celle du monde. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cracked ArmorJoanne AlfredDisclaimers. Names have been changed to protect the privacy of the patient and the patient's family.After three weeks of night shifts, I had built a routine of driving home in darkness and watching the sunrise. It had become my way to push back against a quiet melancholy, the accumulation of loss over time, by remembering that light gently returning each morning. Heading into my last stretch of (...) ten nights in a row, I was intent to hold to this practice, to anchor myself for the challenge. The one-and-a-half years of residency training had prepared me for these moments, opportunities to grow and persist. The first six days of the stretch passed as I had expected, and the confidence and autonomy I had cultivated carried me through. It always had. I had shouldered our neurosurgery service, solitary night shifts at community hospitals, the NICU. I had pronounced a newborn dead on Good Friday, heartbroken by the juxtaposition of life and death. My experiences allowed tears and doubts, but I had always rebounded, chin up and looking onward for the next thing.I had just received sign out, and needed to check on Nate, a young man I'd known since he was first diagnosed with T-cell acute lymphoblastic leukemia (T-Cell ALL). I remembered our first meeting, a new diagnosis with a white cell count in the thousands requiring PICU admission for plasma exchange, all the way to reassuring him his EKG was normal after an incidental finding of hyperkalemia. He had returned to the hospital with abdominal swelling, and dread filled me as I rounded the corner to his room. Looking down at him and back up at his mother, my own distress reflected in their eyes. We needed help. I quickly found the oncology fellow and attending, and we put our heads together, deciding a blood gas and X-ray would be the next best steps. The results confirmed our suspicions.Nate was transferred to the PICU shortly. I watched his mother console him, remembering how much they both disliked the PICU. It was not a [End Page 85] place of pleasant memories, especially as Nate had been working toward remission therapy rather than returning to the intensive care unit, where he fought through his initial diagnosis. While reassuring him and his mother externally, internally my own dread welled further, because my first night in the PICU loomed two days away. To bolster myself for my seventh night shift, I rounded with the PICU team to learn as much as I could. Nate was on BIPAP now, and the decision inexorably moved to intubation. It was all happening rapidly, and the dread started feeling more like panic. Nate's eyes were squeezed shut, his stomach taut, and his breathing shallow. I truly worried for Nate now. I had hoped the PICU would be a temporary stay, a place where we could make a diagnosis and fill the gap. However, when I joined the private conversation the PICU attending had with Nate's mother and she said, "He may never come off the ventilator. He may never speak again," the finality in her voice had more certainty.The "never" struck my brittle residency armor and it cracked. I was not ready to believe it. I could sense his mother felt the same, so we walked along the silent halls of the hospital while she remembered Nate with me as a teenage boy beyond the hospital, not as his ascites and acidosis. Maybe to make his turn for the worse untrue. But I knew something awful was going to happen.On my eighth night, I entered the PICU with trepidation. All I could think about was Nate. He was now on dialysis, struggling with true hyperkalemia. Turning the corner to the unit, my heart racing, begging please don't let him die. It was hard to sense in the moment, but the cumulative melancholy, the sense that it could be held back, was not holding true. So, I defaulted to my splintering armor of persistence, picking apart his labs, discussing his dialysis with the nephrology fellow. I put my head down... (shrink)

Der Laie spricht manchmal die Ansicht aus, die Mathematik ware heutzutage schon eine tote Wissenschaft: nachdem sie einen ungemein hohen Grad der Entwicklung erreicht hat, sei sie in ihrer steinernen Vollkommenheit erstarrt. Dies ist ein vollig irriges Bild der Situation: nur wenige Wissenschaftsgebiete befinden sich heute in der Phase einer solch intensiven Entwicklung wie die Mathematik. Diese Entwicklung ist dabei auBerordentlich vie1seitig: die Mathematik erweitert ihre Domane nach allen moglichen Richtungen, sie wachst in die Rohe, in die Weite und in (...) die Tiefe. Sie wachst in die Rohe, da auf dem Boden ihrer alten Theorien, denen eine jahrhundert-, ja sogar jahrtausend- lange Entwicklung zugrunde liegt, immer wieder neue Prob1eme auftauchen, immer scharfere und vollkommenere Resultate er- zielt werden; in die Weite, da ihre Methoden andere Wissen- schaftszweige durchdringen, ihr Untersuchungsbereich immer umfangreichere Gebiete von Erscheinungen umfaBt und immer neue Theorien in den groBen Kreis mathematischer Disziplinen einbezogen werden; und schlieBlich in die Tiefe, da ihre Grund- lagen immer mehr gefestigt, die bei ihrem Aufbau angewandten Methoden immer vollkommener werden und ihre Prinzipien an Dauerhaftigkeit gewinnen. In dem vorliegenden Buch wiinschte ich dem Leser, der fiir die gegenwartige Mathematik Interesse aufweist, aber ihr fern- steht, mindestens einen ganz allgemeinen Begriff von dieser dritten Entwicklungslinie der Mathematik, d. i. von ihrer Ent- wicklung in die Tiefe, zu geben. (shrink)

One popular style of argument for the thesis that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility features manipulation. Its thrust is that regarding moral responsibility, there is no important difference between various cases of manipulation in which agents who A are not morally responsible for A-ing and ordinary cases of A-ing in deterministic worlds. There is a detailed argument of this kind in Derk Pereboom’s recent book (2001: 112–26). His strategy in what he calls his ‘four-case argument’ (117) is to describe (...) three cases of progressively weaker manipulation in which, he contends, the agent, Plum, is not morally responsible for killing his victim and to compare them to a related deterministic case that involves no manipulation. Pereboom argues that what blocks Plum’s moral responsibility for the killing in the first three cases is the fact that ‘his action results from a deterministic causal process that traces back to factors beyond his control’ and that, because this fact also obtains in the fourth case, Plum is not morally responsible for that killing either (116). My thesis is that Pereboom’s argument fails. (shrink)